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GEORGE ONOPRIENKO* and JACQUELINE E. SHAPIRO**
The authors survey recent Florida cases*** and legislation in
the field of domestic relations. Areas of emphasis include disso-
lution of marriage, alimony, and support and custody of
children.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Protection of the rights of children and equality of the sexes
highlight recent judicial decisions in the field of family law. The
Supreme Court of the United States has invalidated state legis-
lation concerning alimony, paternity, adoption, and illegitimacy
when founded on overbroad, gender-based distinctions. Florida
courts have followed suit, rejecting outmoded sex-related stereo-
types and presumptions in alimony and property matters. The
courts have looked increasingly to the actual needs and contribu-
tions of both spouses. In the area of child custody, strict adherence
to the sex-linked "tender years doctrine" has given way to a recog-
nition that the child's welfare is best served by awarding custody
to the nurturing, psychological parent, whether that be the mother
or the father. In the same area, the Uniform Child Custody Juris-
diction Act, by discouraging child snatching and interstate compe-
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tition, now permits Florida courts to adjudicate and enforce cus-
tody decrees that are truly in the best interests of the child.
II. MARRIAGE
In In re Estate of Donner,1 a former spouse unsuccessfully
challenged as fraudulent her ex-husband's subsequent marriage to
another. The second marriage lasted only thirty-four days; during
the honeymoon, the husband died of a heart attack. The court held
that the duration of the marital relationship is irrelevant to a de-
termination of its bona fide nature. The validity of a marriage de-
pends on the fulfillment of the statutory requirements at its
inception.
In Metropolitan Dade County v. Shelton,2 the deputy clerk of
the court had issued a marriage license two days after the perform-
ance of a ceremonial marriage. According to section 741.08 of the
Florida Statutes, a ceremonial marriage performed without prior
issuance of a marriage license is void.8 But since the two-day gap
between the ceremony and issuance of the license stemmed from
the couple's good faith reliance on the deputy clerk's assurances,
the marriage was upheld as substantially complying with the
statute.
III. DISSOLUTION OF MARRIAGE
A. Residency
The husband-respondent in Curran v. Curran" failed to satisfy
the residency requirement for bringing a suit for dissolution of
marriage.5 Respondent had never lived with his wife in Florida,
lacked a Florida driver's license or any other indicia of residency,
and at the time of trial was living abroad as a civilian. The District
Court of Appeal, Fourth District, held that his stay of less than
one year in Florida fifteen years earlier and his plan to return per-
manently to Florida upon retiring from the Army did not fulfill the
statutory requirement of actual presence in the state for six
months prior to filing, plus intent to remain indefinitely.
Proof of residency was also found lacking in Gordon v.
1. 364 So. 2d 742 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978).
2. 375 So. 2d 32 (Fla. 4th DCA 1979).
3. FLA. STAT. § 741.08 (1979).
4. 362 So. 2d 1042 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978).
5. FLA. STAT. § 61.021 (1979).
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Gordon. In that case, the petitioner was physically absent from
the state with her serviceman husband for two and one-half years
immediately prior to bringing suit for dissolution. Ms. Gordon had
attended high school in Florida, was married and had lived in the
state for over one year during marriage, was registered to vote, was
licensed to drive, was possessed of personal belongings and a mail-
ing address in the state, and had expressed an intention to reside
permanently in Florida. Nevertheless, the District Court of Appeal,
Fourth District, stressed the necessity for actual rather than con-
structive residence and reaffirmed the principle that a wife's resi-
dence remains that of her husband until she separates from the
family.
7
Once a petitioner has met the statutory residency requirement
at the time of filing suit, however, a subsequent change of domicile
prior to the final dissolution hearing does not divest the trial court
of jurisdiction.'
B. Venue
The principle that a wife's domicile generally follows that of
her husband when they reside together was relied on by the Third
District, in reversing a change of venue from Dade to Escambia
County.9 The respondent wife had alleged that she was born and
raised in Escambia County (Pensacola). She and her husband had
married and resided there for about eight months before they left
Florida and took up residence in North Carolina, where they lived
for nearly three years. The husband then returned to Dade
County, where he took up residence and filed for divorce, claiming
his wife was still a resident of North Carolina. She, in an attempt
to show that the service of process by publication was improper,
alleged that she was a resident of Escambia County, pointing to
her payment of a nonresident college fee to a North Carolina col-
lege and her possession of a Florida driver's license and voter regis-
tration. The district court held these factors insufficient evidence
of Florida domicile, particularly since there was no demonstration
of any place in the state where she could have been served person-
ally. Since North Carolina was the last common residence of the
6. 369 So. 2d 421 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979).
7. In a perceptive dissent, Judge Barkdull challenged the conclusions of the majority as
a denial to Ms. Gordon, wife of a military man, of benefits afforded to similarly situated
military men under FLA. STAT. § 46.12 (1979). 369 So. 2d at 423 (Barkdull, J., dissenting).
8. Merritt v. Merritt, 369 So. 2d 1005 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979).
9. Bolles v. Bolles, 364 So. 2d 813 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978).
[Vol. 34:681
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spouses, she would have had to reestablish her residence in Es-
cambia County after her separation, to claim Florida resident
status.
In Hoskins v. Hoskins,10 a husband's occasional weekend visits
to his wife's separate apartment, which had been leased by him,
did not render the estranged spouses residents with the common
intent of remaining married. Since venue is proper not where the
breach occurred, but where the parties last resided together with
the intention of remaining married,1 the trial court properly de-
nied a motion to change venue to the county in which the wife's
apartment was located.
C. Amendment of Petition
In Talbert v. Talbert, 2 a spouse who had obtained two previ-
ous continuances did not seek to amend her answer until eight
days before trial. Since the absence of her husband's counsel had
prompted the initial continuances, however, and since the alimony,
special equity, and child support relief which she sought were vital
to her and her children, leave to amend was granted on appeal.
D. Discovery
The trial court improperly ordered a husband to undergo a
compulsory mental and physical examination in Paul v. Paul," in
which the wife's petition had asserted that he was "a person of
unstable neurological background, is incompetent and mentally de-
ranged."" Given the conclusory nature of the wife's allegation, the
requirement of rule 1.360(a) of the Florida Rules of Civil Proce-
dure' that mental condition must be "in controversy" before. a
spouse need submit to such an examination was not satisfied.
E. Separate Maintenance
In a dissolution proceeding initiated by the husband, the wife
counterclaimed for separate maintenance under section 61.09 of
the Florida Statutes." The trial court dismissed the counterclaim
10. 363 So. 2d 179 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978).
11. Id. See also Tokan v. Tokan, 373 So. 2d 955 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979).
12. 364 So. 2d 541 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978).
13. 366 So. 2d 853 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979).
14. Id. at 854.
15. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.360(a).
16. Weinschel v. Weinschel, 368 So. 2d 386 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979).
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after finding that the wife was an out-of-state resident who with-
out good cause had abandoned her husband to come to Florida.
Reversing the dismissal, the appellate court held that for a party
to obtain an award of separate maintenance, it is not essential that
the marital domicile be in Florida or that the separation be the
fault of the party against whom suit is brought. A contrary rule
would mean that nonresident spouses and children might become
public charges in Florida.
17
F. Establishment of Foreign Divorce Decree
The district court in Yoder v. Yoder"8 affirmed the trial court's
ruling that a proceeding to establish and enforce the provisions of
a Texas divorce decree was neither an independent action for child
support, nor an action to dissolve marriage. Consequently, personal
jurisdiction over the nonresident former spouse could not be ac-
quired by service pursuant to the Florida long arm statute gov-
erning actions for alimony, child support, or property. Thus, a
money decree could be established against the defendant only by
his appearing, answering, or returning to Florida.
IV. ALIMONY
A. Jurisdiction
When alimony was not requested at the final hearing of disso-
lution and both spouses were employed, a wife was foreclosed from
raising the issue of alimony on appeal.1 9
A trial court may not award permanent alimony when it has
been neither sought in the pleadings nor tried "by express or im-
plied consent of the parties, ' 0 pursuant to rule 1.190(b) of the
Florida Rules of Civil Procedure.2
B. Discovery
Although conduct sometimes may be a factor in determining
the amount of an alimony award, the District Court of Appeal,
Second District, held that once a husband has admitted his ability
to pay alimony, questions asked of a nonparty concerning her ex-
17. Id. at 387.
18. 363 So. 2d 409 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978).
19. Laws v. Laws, 364 So. 2d 788 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978).
20. James v. James, 374 So. 2d 1085 (Fla. 5th DCA 1979).
21. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.190(b).
[Vol. 34:681
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tramarital conduct with the spouse and her independent income
are not reasonably calculated to obtain information concerning the
extent of the husband's ability to pay."2 In this case, the trial court
had ordered the husband's nurse to answer interrogatories pro-
pounded by the wife regarding her sexual relationship with the
husband. The Second District vacated the order of the lower court,
stating that although discovery concerning the extent of a hus-
band's ability to pay is legitimate, questions asked of a nurse con-
cerning her conduct with him are not relevant to the point in issue.
C. Criteria
1. CASE LAW
In Orr v. Orr,23 the Supreme Court of the United States invali-
dated a Georgia statute permitting only wives to receive alimony.
Despite a purportedly benign purpose of compensating women for
past marital discrimination, the gender-based classification denied
equal protection. The Court reasoned that by equating the sex of a
spouse with financial need, the scheme both denied compensation
to truly needy husbands and perpetuated an outmoded stereotype
of women as dependent.2 "
Following the principle of Orr, the District Court of Appeal,
Fourth District, found that a permanently and totally disabled
husband had a right to an award of permanent alimony.
Conduct of the parties may also affect the determination of
alimony. Adultery, for example, may be a mitigating factor in
fixing the amount of alimony awarded the adulterous party.2
While concurring with the Third District's reaffirmance of this set-
tled rule, 7 Judge Schwartz illuminated its place within the context
of the current no-fault law. Adultery may form the basis for de-
crease in alimony not because the trial court wishes to punish a
party for misconduct, but because the adultery has directly caused
the irretrievable breakup.' 8 Likewise, as extramarital sexual con-
duct analogous to heterosexual adultery, a wife's lesbian relation-
ship may be considered to decrease her alimony award.'
22. Joldersma v. Stewart, 370 So. 2d 80 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979).
23. 440 U.S. 268 (1979).
24. Id. at 280-82.
25. Connor v. Connor, 372 So. 2d 130 (Fla. 4th DCA 1979).
26. FLA. STAT. § 61.08(1) (1979).
27. Martin v. Martin, 366 So. 2d 475 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979).
28. Id. at 475.
29. Patin v. Patin, 371 So. 2d 682 (Fla. 4th DCA 1979).
1980]
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Other marital misconduct, if it results in strained economic
circumstances for the "innocent" party, may be considered in
fixing an alimony award. In Williamson v. Williamson,0 the Su-
preme Court of Florida reaffirmed the clean hands doctrine ex-
pressed in section 61.08(2) of the Florida Statutes. The doctrine
permits the trial court to consider "any factor to do justice and
equity to the parties."' Mr. Williamson's abandonment of his wife,
taking with him the family savings, and his refusal to reconcile,
despite her willingness, resulted in his wife's poor economic situa-
tion. Since any monetary award would have caused both parties to
suffer financially, the supreme court held that the husband's mis-
conduct precipitating the wife's economic difficulties was an "equi-
table circumstance 32 that could be considered in assessing
alimony.
The trial court in Phillips v. Phillips"3 relied upon an incen-
tive criterion in providing for increased alimony in the event the
wife obtained employment. Because payment of alimony must be
based on the awarded spouse's need, as well as the provider's abil-
ity to pay, however, the trial court's reliance on the incentive crite-
rion rendered the award improper.
3 4
2. LEGISLATION
By express statutory amendment, economic factors relevant to
a determination of alimony include:
(a) The standard of living established during the marriage.
(b) The duration of the marriage.
(c) The age and the physical and emotional condition of
both parties.
(d) The financial resources of each party.
(e) Where applicable, the time necessary for either party
to acquire sufficient education or training to enable him or her
to find appropriate employment.
(f) The contribution of each party to the marriage, includ-
ing, but not limited to, services rendered in homemaking, child
care, education and career building of the other party."
Thus, the new amendment allows more discretion to the court to
30. 367 So. 2d 1016 (Fla. 1979).
31. FLA. STAT. § 61.08(2) (1979).
32. 367 So. 2d at 1019.
33. 372 So. 2d 199 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979).
34. Id. at 200.
35. FLA. STAT. § 61.08(2) (1979).
[Vol. 34:681
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consider all relevant facts and circumstances before awarding ali-
mony. In addition, the amended statute does not bar alimony to an
adulterous wife automatically as was previously the case. 6
D. Rehabilitative Alimony
The District Court of Appeal, First District, struck down a
twenty-year award of rehabilitative alimony to a healthy and
skilled wife. 7 The court found the award counterproductive in
view of the central purpose of rehabilitative alimony, which is to
provide a spouse incentive to regain skills leading to eventual self-
support.
On similar grounds, the Fourth District reversed a five-year
rehabilitative award, finding no evidence that the wife's ability to
support herself would alter after that time.38 The same court re-
duced an award of rehabilitative alimony for an extended period to
two years, since the need for only two years of nursing education
had been demonstrated. 9
In view of the short term of the marriage-seven months-and
the wife's ability to support herself, the Fourth District reduced an
award of rehabilitative alimony from four years to six months or
the time the wife received her college degree, whichever came
first.4 °
In Nicholson v. Nicholson,1 a rehabilitative award that left
the paying spouse with $10.50 per week to live on was held to be
reversible error. Since the wife possessed substantial assets, con-
sisting of equity in the marital home and title to other real prop-
erty, she could not receive any rehabilitative alimony.
Yet, even where a spouse's need is adequately demonstrated,
an award in excess of the other party's net income at the time of
dissolution or one which compels the paying spouse to seek addi-
tional employment is an abuse of discretion.2 A combined award
of alimony and child support amounting to less than one-half the
amount necessary to maintain the family's shared standard of liv-
ing and failing to include the wife's retraining expenses, however,
36. Id. See also notes 26-28 & 30-32 and accompanying text supra.
37. Robinson v. Robinson, 366 So. 2d 1210 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979).
38. Rickling v. Rickling, 364 So. 2d 516 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978).
39. Hunter v. Hunter, 368 So. 2d 627 (Fla. 4th DCA 1979).
40. Murray v. Murray, 374 So. 2d 622 (Fla. 4th DCA 1979).
41. 372 So. 2d 178 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979).
42. Kuntz v. Kuntz, 370 So. 2d 1216 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979).
1980]
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has been reversed as insufficient.48
In Ciraco v. Ciraco,44 the long term nature of the mar-
riage-twenty-four years; the wife's age-forty-two; her poor
health and limited education, job experience, and skills established
the need for permanent rather than rehabilitative alimony. The
husband's yearly income of $23,000 demonstrated his ability to
provide for her.
On parallel facts, the Second District reversed an award of re-
habilitative alimony on dissolution of a thirty-two year marriage.48
Lacking job training or experience, as well as any education be-
yond high school, the fifty-six-year-old wife had little potential for
effective rehabilitation. In view of her retired husband's receipt of
a military pension, he should have been required to pay her per-
manent alimony.
By contrast, a thirty-six-year-old wife with excellent health,
work experience as both a licensed school teacher and licensed real
estate broker, and possession of the parties' valuable marital home
was entitled only to rehabilitative rather than permanent ali-
mony.46 Similarly, a wife who possessed a master's degree in social
work and earned $8,000 as a university professor was properly
awarded rehabilitative rather than permanent alimony.47 When,
however, physical and emotional illnesses of the parties' children
made it impossible for the wife to work full time, she was entitled
to permanent alimony.
In Hall v. Hall,49 the Second District affirmed an award of re-
habilitative alimony, despite the fact that the parties had planned
for the wife to remain at home to care for the children and that her
retraining entailed leaving them to commute to a distant city.
Since the wife was thirty-eight years of age, had some teaching ex-
perience and needed only a Florida certificate to teach in the state,
the court found no abuse of discretion in failing to award perma-
nent alimony.
By contrast, the First District in Bender v. Bender8 ' upheld an
award of permanent alimony in an effort to preserve the parties'
plan that the wife remain at home as a full-time mother. Since the
43. Hall v. Hall, 363 So. 2d 137 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978).
44. 363 So. 2d 53 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978).
45. Sullivan v. Sullivan, 363 So. 2d 393 (Fla. 2d DCA 1978).
46. Nott v. Nott, 368 So. 2d 669 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979).
47. Eichenbaum v. Eichenbaum, 372 So. 2d 509 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979).
48. Weeks v. Weeks, 363 So. 2d 602 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978).
49. 363 So. 2d 137 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978).
50. 363 So. 2d 844 (Fla. lst DCA 1978).
[Vol. 34:681
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court agreed with the trial court's reasoning that dissolution does
not end the decision of the parties regarding child rearing, 51 Ms.
Bender could not be required to return to work as a secretary. The
husband's substantial yearly income of over $100,000 demon-
strated his clear ability to provide permanent alimony of $2,500 a
month.
In upholding an award of permanent alimony to a wife already
possessed of a teaching certificate and part-time employment, the
Second District applied a seemingly less stringent standard than it
had applied in Hall." Prompting the affirmance was the court's
concern that even were the wife to obtain a full-time teaching posi-
tion, her standard of living would still remain considerably less
than what she had enjoyed during marriage.
The "fabulously wealthy" lifestyle of the parties in Lutgert v.
Lutgert54 supported an award of permanent rather than rehabilita-
tive alimony. Although the wife, over fifty years of age at the time
of dissolution, had not worked full time for thirty years, she did
possess a real estate license. Given her husband's assets of approxi-
mately $25,000,000, however, her potential earnings in real estate
could not possibly reach the high level of income which she had
enjoyed while married.
E. Permanent Alimony
In Cyphers v. Cyphers," the Second District upheld an award
of permanent alimony to a spouse who had worked as a housewife
during most of the thirty-six-year marriage and who, upon divorce,
would lose benefits which would otherwise accrue to her as the wife
of a retired military man. During the last years of her marriage,
the wife had operated a dress shop. Because it was an unprofitable
business whose future success was uncertain, however, an award of
permanent alimony was warranted.
F. Modification
In Frizzell v. Bartley,56 respondent had sought modification of
the alimony and child support provisions of an agreement between
51. Id. at 845.
52. Thomas v. Thomas, 364 So. 2d 78 (Fla. 2d DCA 1978).
53. See note 49 and accompanying text supra.
54. 362 So. 2d 58 (Fla. 2d DCA 1978).
55. 373 So. 2d 442 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979).
56. 372 So. 2d 1371 (Fla. 1979).
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the spouses which had not been incorporated into the final judg-
ment. The trial court held that section 61.14 of the Florida Stat-
utes,5" authorizing judicial modification of alimony and support
provisions, impairs private contract in violation of the state and
federal constitutions." The Supreme Court of Florida reversed,
upholding the constitutionality of the statute. At the time the par-
ties concluded their agreement on alimony and child support, the
statute allowing modification had existed some twenty-seven years.
The court reasoned that all state legislation on the subject, includ-
ing section 61.14, had been incorporated into the contract terms.
Thus, present modification of the agreement pursuant to section
61.14 did not constitute an impairment of the contract's
obligations.59
Where a spouse is held in contempt for nonpayment of ali-
mony, the doctrine of clean hands proscribes the court from simul-
taneously modifying alimony payments. 60
In Langstaff v. Langstaff," the Fourth District struck a provi-
sion for reduction of periodic alimony upon sale of the parties'
marital home. Since the awarded wife would have to seek another
residence after the sale, her financial needs would remain the
same. The court therefore felt the sale would not constitute a sub-
stantial change justifying the automatic modification.
Similarly improper is a stipulation for increase in child sup-
port upon termination of rehabilitative alimony.62 The Fourth Dis-
trict perceived the predetermined increase as demonstrating a
need of the custodial spouse for additional support in the form of
permanent alimony.
Other recent cases have held as follows:
Section 61.14 permits modification only on the basis of
changed circumstances. Once the court has ordered modification, it
may not reexamine the same circumstances for the purpose of fur-
ther modification. 3
A spouse's bare assertion of future reduction in income does
not justify denial of permanent alimony, where the need for con-
tinued support has been demonstrated. 64
57. FLA. STAT. § 61.14 (1979).
58. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 10; FLA. CONST. art. 1, § 10.
59. 372 So. 2d at 1372.
60. Mayer v. Mayer, 373 So. 2d 931 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979).
61. 363 So. 2d 399 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978).
62. Kvittem v. Kvittem, 365 So. 2d 791 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978).
63. Hosford v. Hosford, 362 So. 2d 973 (Fla. lt DCA 1978).
64. Tierney v. Tierney, 368 So. 2d 111 (Fla. 4th DCA 1979).
[Vol. 34:681
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In another case, the ex-wife secured an increase in alimony.
The District Court of Appeal, First District, noted that the income
of the ex-husband's new spouse could not be a basis for a modifica-
tion of an alimony award, but upheld the increase in this case be-
cause the ex-husband's income had grown independently of his
new marriage. 65
While loss of purchasing power of the dollar is a proper ele-
ment for consideration in modifying alimony, it is insufficient, by
itself, to support an increase. 66
Incarceration of the spouse paying alimony is not a material
change justifying temporary suspension of alimony obligations."
Where the custodial spouse has failed to challenge child visita-
tion terms at trial or on appeal, his or her subsequent failure to
comply with rights granted is a material change in circumstances
warranting suspension of alimony."e
G. Enforcement
The trial court has discretion to secure payment of alimony
and child support (on which substantial arrearages existed at the
time of final judgment) through imposition of a lien against the
recalcitrant spouse's real property.69
H. Lump Sum Alimony
1. JURISDICTION
The trial court retains authority to award lump sum alimony
regardless of whether the pleadings have specifically sought such
alimony.10
2. CRITERIA
Lump sum alimony may not be awarded unless the provider
has economic ability to pay. Further, a reasonable purpose and
special circumstances must exist to justify the award.7 ' Thus, in a
situation where the wife would have benefitted equally from an
award of permanent alimony, a lump sum award of a husband's
65. Harville v. Harville, 369 So. 2d 377 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979).
66. Greene v. Greene, 372 So. 2d 189 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979).
67. Tompkins v. Tompkins, 362 So. 2d 689 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978).
68. Gordon v. Gordon, 368 So. 2d 1356 (Fla. 4th DCA 1979).
69. Adler v. Adler, 362 So. 2d 468 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978).
70. Caidin v. Caidin, 367 So. 2d 248 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979).
71. Riscile v. Riscile, 370 So. 2d 819 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979).
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interest in a liquor license was stricken since it would have served
only to hurt the husband economically.
72
A special equity justifying an award of lump sum alimony dif-
fers from that necessary to establish a claim to personal property.
For instance, in Caidin v. Caidin7 8 a wife's employment as a thera-
pist technician, necessitated by the husband's illness during the
marriage, constituted a "special equity" supporting her award of
lump sum alimony.
In a long term marriage, a wife's sacrifice of career to remain
at home also may justify an award of lump sum alimony. In Eddy
v. Eddy, 4 the First District held insufficient an award of lump sum
alimony in the amount of $75,000 to be paid periodically over sev-
enteen years. The wife was married at sixteen, lacked a high school
diploma, and had limited work experience outside the home. Citing
to Douglas v. Douglas,5 the district court held that the wife
should receive additional lump sum alimony.
In contrast, the district court in Lee v. Lee7 6 found no special
equity in the fact that the wife had worked in her husband's busi-
ness. The trial court had awarded the wife lump sum alimony con-
sisting of all her husband's assets except for a ski school business.
On appeal, the court noted that the husband frequently had
worked at two jobs during the marriage and that such an award
would cause "a shocking change in [his] financial condition. 77
Under these circumstances, the court felt that lump sum alimony
was inappropriate.
A lump sum award of an automobile to a spouse was valid in
view of the party's special need for it to provide a means of trans-
portation to work.
78
The questions of lump sum alimony, permanent periodic ali-
mony, and "special equity" were clarified recently by the Supreme
Court of Florida in Canakaris v. Canakaris79 in a way that should
affect all future decisions on lump sum alimony. In Canakaris, the
wife had been awarded lump sum alimony consisting of $50,000 in
cash and the husband's interest in their jointly owned residence,
plus $500 per week permanent periodic alimony and one of the
72. Id.
73. 367 So. 2d 248 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979).
74. 366 So. 2d 49 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978).
75. 361 So. 2d 212, 214 (Fla. 2d DCA 1978).
76. 365 So. 2d 742 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978).
77. Id. atp743.
78. Cypher v. Cypher, 373 So. 2d 442 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979).
79. 382 So. 2d 1197 (Fla. 1980); see note 99 infra.
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family automobiles. She also retained her individual one-half inter-
est in hospital realty held as a tenancy by the entireties. The su-
preme court held, among other things, that the award of the hus-
band's interest in the marital home was improper since she lacked
a "special equity" in it.
The court said that the term "special equity" should not be
used in connection with lump sum alimony, but should be used to
describe only those situations involving "a vested interest in prop-
erty brought into marriage or acquired during the marriage be-
cause of contribution of funds or services over and above normal
marital duties." 80 Such an interest is not alimony. Lump sum ali-
mony depends not on a finding of a prior vested right, but on a
consideration of all relevant circumstances to ensure an equitable
distribution of property acquired during the marriage.8 Once
granted, the award becomes a vested right which is not terminable
upon a spouse's remarriage or death, unlike permanent periodic al-
imony, which is so terminable.8 2 A trial judge possesses broad dis-
cretion to award lump sum alimony, and his decision cannot be
overturned if it meets the test of "reasonableness." Basically, such
an award may be made when the evidence shows (1) a justification
for such lump sum payment, and (2) the financial ability of the
other spouse to make such payment without substantially endan-
gering his or her economic status.88 In the instant case, the su-
preme court held that the trial court had not abused its discretion
in awarding the husband's interest in the residence as lump sum
alimony.
3. MODIFICATION
Once awarded, lump sum alimony creates a vested property
settlement which may not be modified." In Benson v. Benson,85 a
property settlement agreement incorporated into a final dissolution
judgment called for lump sum alimony payable in installments.
The husband petitioned for extension of the pay schedule, assert-
ing changed financial conditions. Since parties have the right to
rely on their original property agreement, the petition was
untenable.
80. Id. at 1200.
81. Id. at 1201.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Goldman v. Goldman, 362 So. 2d 389 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978).
85. 369 So. 2d 99 (Fla. 4th DCA 1979).
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4. MARITAL HOME
In Simpson v. Simpson," the District Court of Appeal, Fourth
District, held that an award as lump sum alimony of a marital
home owned as a tenancy by the entireties was improper absent a
showing of positive necessity by the awarded spouse. Since the
spouse needed only provision of a home in which to reside, grant-
ing exclusive possession or, alternatively, increasing permanent ali-
mony, would have sufficed.
In Reid v. Reid,87 the Fourth District reversed an award of the
marital home in the form of lump sum alimony as an impermissi-
ble attempt by the trial court to make a property settlement for
the hostile spouses. Each party had been awarded custody of one
child, no mortgage encumbered the property, the contributions of
each to the home were not disproportionate, and both were em-
ployed. Thus, the wife lacked any special equity in the home. The
contention that the parties were too hostile toward each other to
own property jointly offered insufficient reason to award the home
to the wife as lump sum alimony.88
In Mitchell v. Mitchell,89 the trial court held that the wife's
work and help in paying the mortgage during the three-year mar-
riage were nonrecoverable contributions to the marriage. The
Fourth District upheld the finding of no special equity in the mari-
tal partners' home, on the grounds that the house was purchased
prior to the marriage with the husband's money and title was in
the husband's name alone.
Similarly, the supreme court in Ingram v. Ingram" upheld the
trial court's discretion in rejecting the husband's contentions that
his contributions towards payment of the mortgage and home im-
provements during the eight year marriage created a special equity
in the marital home in his favor. The wife had bought the home
ten months before the marriage. The court noted, however, that
the trial judge did not lack discretionary authority to find such an
equity in the husband, should it have been necessary to do equity
between the parties.' 1
The Supreme Court of Florida has held that when a spouse's
need is demonstrated, exclusive possession of the marital home
86. 372 So. 2d 526 (Fla. 4th DCA 1979).
87. 365 So. 2d 1050 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978).
88. Id. at 1051.
89. 368 So. 2d 628 (Fla. 4th DCA 1979).
90. 379 So. 2d 955 (Fla. 1980).
91. Id. at 956.
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may be awarded not only as lump sum alimony or as part of a
child support obligation, but as a form of rehabilitative alimony.
9
2
In McDonald v. McDonald"3 the court found that the limited edu-
cation and skills of the wife in a twenty-two-year marriage demon-
strated her need, even though the children were grown and the
award was neither in the form of lump sum alimony nor in the
form of child support.
In a similar case involving award to the husband of temporary,
exclusive use of jointly held property occupied by the husband's
parents, the supreme court rejected a finding that the husband had
a special equity in the property, but concurred in the award of ex-
clusive possession.94 The trial court based its finding of a special
equity on the husband's significant contributions in acquiring and
improving the property. Citing Ball v. Ball,"' the supreme court
held that a vested special equity does not arise "when property is
acquired from funds generated by a working spouse while the other
spouse performed normal household and child-rearing responsibili-
ties." 6 Since the critical question in the award of exclusive posses-
sion, however, is simply whether the award is equitable, the trial
court, without a finding of such special equity, could make a dis-
cretionary grant of such possession. The court agreed that in this
case there was a demonstrated need for exclusive possession to as-
sure the husband's fiscal ability to provide support for the wife and
minor children. 7
In another case, an order to sell the marital home within six
months of the final judgment with an accompanying limitation of
the wife's and children's possession of the home to the six-month
period, was improper on two grounds. First, there had been no for-
mal pleadings requesting partition. Additionally, the wife was enti-
tled to occupancy of the house formerly held as tenancy by the
entireties for as long as she remained unmarried and had minor
children."'
92. McDonald v. McDonald, 368 So. 2d 1283 (Fla. 1979).
93. Id.
94. Duncan v. Duncan, 379 So. 2d 949 (Fla. 1980).
95. 335 So. 2d 5 (Fla. 1976).
96. 379 So. 2d at 952.
97. Id. at 953.
98. Bianchini v. Bianchini, 374 So. 2d 620 (Fla. 4th DCA 1979).
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General reservation of jurisdiction in a final judgment of disso-
lution preserves the trial court's authority to enforce the property
rights determined therein. It will not support alteration of the orig-
inal order by directing a contradictory partition of property. 9
Accordingly, the District Court of Appeal, Third District, held
that the trial court in Gutjahr v. Gutjahr,100 had authority to de-
clare the wife owner of securities which had been pledged for a
loan. Since the final judgment required the husband to return the
securities to his wife, the trial court's subsequent declaration was
not a contradictory disposition of property rights or a reconsidera-
tion of obligations previously determined, but rather a proper en-
forcement measure.
In Poling v. Tresidder,10 1 the final judgment of dissolution had
awarded the husband exclusive possession of the marital home as
long as he lived in it, with proceeds to be divided equally upon
sale. The husband later petitioned the trial court to determine his
interests in the tenancy in common, including credit for improve-
ment expenses. Since the original judgment failed to reserve juris-
diction, the trial court lacked authority to hear the husband's
petition.
Special equity may not be awarded without specification of
the res to which the equity is attached and record support of con-
tributions to that res. 102 In Parra v. Parra,'0° petitioner unsuccess-
fully sought enforcement of a court order awarding her a special
equity in her husband's land, located in North Carolina. The origi-
nal order, however, failed to provide a legal description of the
property, to require conveyance, or to fix a time for performance.
Consequently, although the trial court possessed jurisdiction over
the parties, it lacked jurisdiction over the real property and could
99. Mason v. Mason, 371 So. 2d 226 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979). The following discussion of
property rights reflects the state of Florida law prior to the recent supreme court decisions
in Canakaris v. Canakaris, 382 So. 2d 1197 (Fla. 1980), and Duncan v. Duncan, 379 So. 2d
949 (Fla. 1980). For a fuller discussion of the impact of these important cases, see the forth-
coming casenote on Canakaris in 34 U. MIAMI L. REv. - (Sept. 1980).
100. 368 So. 2d 93 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979).
101. 373 So. 2d 405 (Fla. 4th DCA 1979).
102. Veiner v. Veiner, 364 So. 2d 834 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978).




The court's reluctance to make property agreements for the
parties extends to partition of the parties' marital home and divi-
sion of personal property therein. Chapter 64 of the Florida Stat-
utes provides for judicial sale of a marital residence only after the
parties have failed to sell the home themselves by a reasonable
deadline.' °4 Thus, in Sullivan v. Sullivan,0 5 the court lacked au-
thority to sell the home owned as a tenancy by the entireties and
to divide the proceeds equally because the judgment had failed to
set a deadline for sale of the home by the parties. Likewise, the
court's failure to set a date for sale of the personal property and
furnishings rendered ineffectual the court-ordered provision. Ab-
sent proper pleadings in accordance with chapter 64 of the Florida
Statutes, the court may not order partition of real property which
is not sold within ninety days.' 06
2. APPLICATION OF FOREIGN LAW
A trial court may not, sua sponte, apply foreign law in prop-
erty proceedings. In order to ensure the parties full opportunity to
address the issue, foreign law may be relied upon only where raised
in the pleadings by the parties themselves.'
07
3. SPECIAL EQUITY DOCTRINE
In the disposition of real property, record title prevails, absent
a showing of special equity consisting of a contribution of financial
or personal services. Although there is no longer a presumption of
donative intent, a showing by the preponderance of evidence that
conveyance of real property was intended as a gift will rebut an
assertion of special equity. 08 In Laws v. Laws'0 the wife claimed a
special equity in real property because she had acquired it in a
property settlement prior to her present marriage. She denied any
donative intent in the conveyance of the property to herself and
her husband, thereby creating a tenancy by the entireties. The
court found this "bald assertion" 0 inadequate and held that a
preponderance of evidence proved the requisite intent to make a
104. FLA. STAT. §§ 64.011-.091 (1979).
105. 363 So. 2d 393 (Fla. 2d DCA 1978).
106. Guy v. Guy, 364 So. 2d 70 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978).
107. Schubot v. Schubot, 363 So. 2d 841 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978).
108. Laws v. Laws, 364 So. 2d 798 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978).
109. Id.
110. Id. at 801.
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gift of the property to her husband. The evidence included the
documentary evidence of the warranty deed and the wife's execu-
tion of a will at the same time that left the property to her
husband.
In Parramore v. Parramore,1" the husband conveyed to his
wife and himself land acquired by him prior to marriage. Since at
the time of the deed's execution state law presumed a gift of the
entireties' interest, the husband was not entitled to a special eq-
uity in the property.
Petitioner's contribution towards payment for the parties' real
property both before and after separation of the spouses, in addi-
tion to the admission by her husband that he considered petitioner
to be part owner, established her right to special equity in the
property.l""
In Forehand v. Forehand,118 petitioner had a right to special
equity in the marital home originally titled in her name and ac-
quired by her prior to marriage. Although title was transferred by
her to a tenancy by the entireties in an effort to obtain a mortgage
loan, no intention to make a gift was found. The husband was enti-
tled to a special equity as well, however, since he had used over
$5,000 which he had acquired prior to marriage, to make home im-
provements. Thus, the trial court erred in failing to recognize the
husband's special equity and in awarding the full and complete
ownership of the home.
14
In Sanders v. Sanders,"' the First District modified peti-
tioner's award of the parties' marital home as a special equity.
During marriage, the wife had sold a home which she had owned
prior to the marriage and contributed $3,000 of the proceeds to-
wards the parties' jointly owned marital home. The husband, how-
ever, had asserted that he had paid $4,700 of his inheritance to
make home improvements. Although the trial court's factual find-
ings had accepted the wife's version over that of the husband's, the
First District nevertheless reduced the wife's special equity to a
$3,000 interest in the home.
In Tinsley v. Bonner,116 the Third District upheld an award to
the husband of the parties' former residence and a grant to the
111. 368 So. 2d 1308 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978).
112. Johnson v. Johnson, 367 So. 2d 695 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979).
113. 363 So. 2d 829 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978).
114. Id. at 832.
115. 362 So. 2d 284 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978).
116. 362 So. 2d 975 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978).
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wife of her husband's interest in other property. The husband had
acquired the home prior to marriage and had transferred title to
both parties in exchange for a deed to his wife's individually owned
home. The wife had challenged the court's ability to change title,
but the awards were affirmed because of the trial court's finding of
a special equity in her husband's favor. Moreover, since the wife
had fully litigated the issue of title, she was not allowed on appeal




In Kilmark v. Kilmark,118 a property settlement agreement in-
corporated into a final judgment provided for alimony and child
support payments. The husband contended that the agreement
was one to pay alimony and sought modification under rule 1.540
of the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure. 9 The trial court upheld
the agreement as a nonmodifiable property settlement. Subse-
quently, the parties filed a joint stipulation and a rule 1.540 mo-
tion to alter the first judge's ruling, pursuant to which the alimony
payments were modified. Upon the husband's failure to pay the
modified award, the wife successfully petitioned for contempt. The
husband challenged the contempt order as void for lack of jurisdic-
tion. Relying on the trial court's initial determination, he asserted
that as a property agreement its provisions were unenforceable by
contempt. On appeal, the Second District found that under rule
1.540 the second judge possessed subject matter jurisdiction to
hear the joint motion for modification. Since the husband was es-
topped from challenging the order that he had sought, the con-
tempt order was upheld.120
A husband's failure to pay one-half the expenses, consisting of
mortgage payments, taxes, and repairs owed on property held as a
tenancy in common supported a judgment of contempt.' The case
was remanded to determine whether the husband's allegation of
his wife's willfulness in blocking sale of the home as ordered under
the final judgment supported imposition of sanctions upon her as
117. Id. at 978.
118. 366 So. 2d 794 (Fla. 2d DCA 1978).
119. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.540. Among other things, rule 1.540 permits relief from judg-
ments, decrees or orders in which there are clerical mistakes arising from oversight or
omission.
120. 366 So. 2d at 797.
121. Gainsborg v. Gainsborg, 362 So. 2d 1028 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978).
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well.12
A contempt order also was upheld for a wife's failure to sell
property as stipulated in the property settlement agreement incor-
porated into the final judgment of dissolution. " A contempt order
is unsupportable, however, where no affirmative finding exists as to
the spouse's ability to comply and willful failure to do so.2"
5. MORTGAGE CREDIT
A spouse who pays mortgage, taxes, insurance, and other ex-
penses on a jointly owned marital home of which she has been
awarded possession for the duration of the children's minority is
entitled to credit against her former husband's proceeds upon sale
of the home. 12 The court may not require a party to increase a
former spouse's equity by making unreimbursed payments such as
these.
B. Personal Property
In a case in which the husband appealed a distribution of joint
assets as inequitable, the distribution was upheld. Since the wife
had furnished all assets and living expenses of the marriage and
the husband's sole contribution was his management of them, the
distribution was not inequitable to him, and the trial court did not
abuse its discretion.
1"
C. Special Equity Doctrine
In Snider v. Snider, 1 7 the Third District rejected a husband's
claim of special equity in notes and mortgages held jointly by the
spouses. By paying family expenses during the marriage, the wife
had enabled her husband to make valuable real estate investments
and thus had contributed towards creation of the notes. Rejecting
the husband's assertion that he had placed the notes in joint
names for survivorship purposes only, the Third District upheld
the finding of donative intent on his part.
A wife's claim to diamonds given her as a gift by her husband
122. Id. at 1029.
123. Firestone v. Ferguson, 372 So. 2d 490 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979).
124. See, e.g., Murphy v. Murphy, 370 So. 2d 403, 409 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979).
125. Rubino v. Rubino, 372 So. 2d 539 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979).
126. Ritter v. Ritter, 362 So. 2d 384 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978) (per curiam).
127. 371 So. 2d 1056 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979).
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was rejected in Winner v. Winner.128 Since the diamonds were at
all times located in an out-of-state bank (pledged as security for a
loan), the wife failed to prove the essential element of donative
intent, actual or constructive delivery.
The Second District reversed an award of jointly owned fur-
nishings to a wife, because the pleadings failed to seek partition as
outlined in chapter 64 of the Florida Statutes (1977) and special
equity was neither claimed nor demonstrated.1
29
In Murphy v. Murphy,'"0 the trial court awarded respondent a
special equity in real and personal property held in her husband's
name. Although respondent had paid for the property with money
unconnected with the marriage, she had made her husband joint
owner at his insistence. Noting that contractual interpretation is
usually a matter for the trial court, the Third District rejected pe-
titioner's assertion that the conveyances constituted a postnuptial
property settlement agreement binding upon the court.' 13 The eq-
uities as found by the trial court were compelling:
[Tihe equities ... are with the Wife .... The Husband chose
to live on the monies received by the Wife .... The Husband
will leave this marriage ... better off financially than when he
entered it .... Upon dissolution, this Court sees no reason to
extend a lifetime of ease which he has done so little to earn.
182
In another case, a husband unsuccessfully challenged his wife's
entitlement to a one-half interest in the parties' jointly held securi-
ties.' No special equity existed to overcome record title since the
securities were not purchased from sources unconnected with the
marriage. The court did not accord credibility to the husband's
claim that placement of title in both names resulted from a mis-
take on the part of his brokers.
The Second District has extended to personal property the
principle of Ball v. Ball,' 4 which abolished any presumpton of gift
in the supply of jointly held real property from a source uncon-
nected to the marriage. Following Ball, the court in Lawless v.
Lawless- 5 concluded that if each spouse had placed funds from
128. 370 So. 2d 845 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979).
129. Cyphers v. Cyphers, 373 So. 2d 443, 445 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979).
130. 370 So. 2d 403 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979).
131. Id. at 407.
132. Id. at 405.
133. Genoe v. Genoe, 373 So. 2d 940 (Fla. 4th DCA 1979).
134. 335 So. 2d 5 (Fla. 1976).
135. 362 So. 2d 302 (Fla. 2d DCA 1978).
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individual savings into a joint account for the purpose of conven-
ience, rather than to convey a gift, that supported a finding of spe-
cial equity in favor of the wife for her contribution.
D. Dower Rights
No equitable lien or encumbrance may be imposed upon a sur-
viving spouse's dower, for it takes precedence over all other claims
to a decedent's estate."3 6
The right to dower may be taken away only by the widow's
voluntary consent, by her own act, or by statute." 7
VI. PROPERTY SETTLEMENT AGREEMENTS
A. Antenuptial Agreements
The District Court of Appeal, Second District, has held that
the marital misconduct of spouses will not void an antenuptial
agreement. Since any future dissolution is likely to be predicated
upon some form of misconduct or breach of marital duty, voiding
of an antenuptial agreement on such grounds would undermine its
purpose and usefulness. 8'
B. Postnuptial Agreements
True legal status of the terms of a property settlement agree-
ment incorporated into a final judgment is determined by examin-
ing the intent of the parties, according to the court in Coffin v.
Coffin.1 9 Mere labeling of its terms as property does not preclude
modification of provisions construed as child support or alimony.
, Alimony provisions of a settlement agreement are subject to
change without a showing of hardship. Factors such as a change in
the spouse's status to self-supporting or a change in the status of
minor children also may be considered to justify modification.""
Monthly financial payments provided to the wife as part of
the property settlement agreement in return for a transfer of her
interest in the parties' real property may not be modified.""
Similarly, provision for periodic payments under a property
settlement agreement may not be modified if it has been bargained
136. In re Estate of Donner, 364 So. 2d 753 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978).
137. In re Estate of Donner, 364 So. 2d 742, 752 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978).
138. Maloy v. Maloy, 362 So. 2d 484 (Fla. 2d DCA 1978).
139. 368 So. 2d 105 (Fla. 4th DCA 1979).
140. Cambest v. Cambest, 367 So. 2d 686 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979).
141. Coniglio v. Coniglio, 370 So. 2d 86 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979).
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for in consideration of a waiver of legal rights in the other spouse's
property.14
In Hirsch v. Hirsch,"3 the parties had entered into a separa-
tion agreement, its terms to be governed by New York law. In ren-
dering a final judgment of dissolution, the Florida court increased
the lump sum alimony provision in the separation agreement. The
court based its modification on a finding of substantial change in
circumstances. According to New York law, however, alimony may
be modified only if the spouse is likely to become a public charge if
support is not increased."4' Since the wife in Hirsch had net assets
of $5,000 she did not meet the higher New York standard and the
district court reversed the lower court's modification. The modifi-
cation also was invalid because both Florida and New York pro-
scribe modification of a lump sum award in a property settlement
agreement.'4"
In Bakshandeh v. Bakshandeh,'" the trial court vacated a
property agreement contained in a final decree of marriage dissolu-
tion after finding that the husband had induced the wife by coer-
cion and duress to enter into the agreement. During marriage the
husband had urged her to take a medical training program admis-
sions exam in place of her sister. He then used his wife's "indiscre-
tion" to blackmail her into signing the agreement; the wife feared
she would lose her own license to practice medicine if the substitu-
tion were discovered. Since a property settlement agreement may
be set aside when a party has been compelled to enter into it
through duress, the agreement was properly stricken.
In Swad v. Swad,147 a postnuptial separation agreement at-
tached to a final judgment was upheld by the trial court, since it
was executed voluntarily after full disclosure and was in the best
interest of the parties.
VII. ATTORNEY'S FEES
A. Jurisdiction
A spouse's voluntary dismissal of a dissolution proceeding di-
vests the trial court of power to award attorney's fees thereafter. 4 s
142. Fagan v. Lewis, 374 So. 2d 18 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979).
143. 369 So. 2d 407 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979).
144. Id. at 408.
145. Id. at 409.
146. 370 So. 2d 417 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979).
147. 363 So. 2d 18 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978).
148. Hayden v. Hayden, 373 So. 2d 436 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979).
1980] FAMILY LA W
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
In this case, the wife had voluntarily dismissed her action for dis-
solution of marriage and at the same time discharged her attorney
before the court made its order determining attorney's fees. The
appellate court reversed the judgment for fees, stating that once
the action had been dismissed, the trial court lost power to adjudi-
cate. the cause in any way. The attorney could recover his fees,
however, by filing a separate action.
When a petition for modification does not include a request
for attorney's fees, the trial court lacks the authority to award such
fees after the time has run for rehearing and appeal on the modifi-
cation order.14 9 According to the District Court of Appeal, Fourth
District, the reservation of jurisdiction in the initial final judgment
related to past, rather than future attorney's fees.150
Unless a party's attorney has claimed a charging lien, the trial
court may not require a party to pay his or her attorney's fees.1"'
Since a litigant may be placed in an adversarial relationship with
his or her own attorney regarding payment of fees, an order of pay-
ment made by the court on its own initiative would deprive the
party of due process.
B. Criteria
The touchstone of an award of attorney's fees is the relative
financial position of the parties. In Sumner v. Tart,"2 failure to
award a wife attorney's fees was an abuse of discretion, given the
fact that in contrast to her spouse, the wife lacked any income.
Elements to be considered in fixing the amount of attorney's
fees include "services rendered, responsibility incurred, the nature
of the services, the skill required, the circumstances under which it
was rendered, the ability of the litigant to respond, the value of the
services to the client, and the beneficial results, if any, of the ser-
vices." 153 Thus, in Gray v. Gray,5 4 the trial court erred in basing
its denial of the wife's motion for attorney's fees solely on the
ground that the husband had raised a legitimate judicial question
in his motion to modify.
149. McCallum v. McCallum, 364 So. 2d 97 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978) (per curiam). See also
Adler v. Adler, 365 So. 2d 411 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978).
150. 364 So. 2d at 98.
151. Conroy v. Conroy, 370 So. 2d 1188 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979).
152. 362 So. 2d 344 (Fla. lt DCA 1978) (per curiam).
153. Dash v. Dash, 363 So. 2d 48 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978) (quoting Pfohl v. Pfohl, 345 So. 2d
371, 379 (Fla. 3d DCA 1971)).
154. 362 So. 2d 294 (Fla. 2d DCA 1978) (per curiam).
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Self-serving testimony by a party's counsel as to the value of
legal services which he or she has rendered is, by itself, insufficient
to support an award of attorney's fees.'
The trial court may not award attorney's fees without receiv-
ing evidence of the value and nature of the services rendered by
the attorney.1 5 6 Thus, although representation of a spouse by the
Legal Aid Society was based on a determination by the Society
that neither marital partner had the ability to pay, such a finding
was not legally binding. The trial court must independently deter-
mine the spouse's need and the other party's ability to pay reason-
able attorney's fees.1
57
Plaintiff in In re Estate of Donner" had entered into a con-
tingency fee contract with her attorneys, promising them one-third
of whatever she might recover against her late husband's estate.
Upon establishment of her right to dower, the trial court awarded
a fee based upon the reasonable value of her attorney's services.
The Third District upheld the award, reasoning that since the
amount of recovery had not been determined finally, a contingency
award would be too speculative. In any event, existence of a con-
tingency contract is only one of a number of criteria which may be
considered in assessing attorney's fees. 59
The purpose of awarding attorney's fees is to afford both
spouses comparable opportunity to obtain sound representation.
Following that rationale, the Fourth District in Scattergood v.
Scattergood'" reversed an award of attorney's fees to the wife
whose net worth equalled that of her husband and whose yearly
income was nearly $20,000.
Similarly, in Winston v. Winston,' the Third District invali-
dated an award of attorney's fees to a wife whose present financial
situation and prospects for future earnings were better than those
of her husband.
In Diaco v. Diaco,'2 a wife who herself lacked sufficient funds
was compelled to take money from her father to pay attorney's
fees. Since an award of attorney's fees depends on the relative
155. Wilson v. Wilson, 362 So. 2d 1030 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978).
156. Pearce v. Pearce, 363 So. 2d 1146 (Fla. 2d DCA 1978) (per curiam).
157. Love v. Love, 370 So. 2d 1231 (Fla. 4th DCA 1979).
158. 364 So. 2d 761 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978).
159. Universal Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Georgei Enterprises, Inc., 345 So. 2d 412 (Fla.
2d DCA 1977).
160. 363 So. 2d 601 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978).
161. 362 So. 2d 149 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978).
162. 363 So. 2d 183 (Fla. 2d DCA 1978).
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financial status of the spouses, the wife's reliance on her father did
not relieve her husband from his obligation to provide reasonable
attorney's fees.
VIII. SUPPORT OF CHILDREN
A. Discovery
The Third District held that a father's financial status was not
discoverable under rule 1.280 of the Florida Rules of Civil Proce-
dure, in a suit brought by him to determine his child support obli-
gations under a settlement agreement incorporated into a final
judgment of dissolution. " ' The father had petitioned for a de-
crease in the amount of child support or, in the alternative, a de-
claratory judgment concerning whether he was still obligated to
pay support for the child while at the same time paying for his
college expenses. The court viewed the action as akin to a declara-
tory judgment rather than a request for modification based on
changed financial circumstances, and therefore held that he did
not have to produce financial records or answer interrogatories
concerning his financial status propounded by his ex-wife.
B. Financial Affidavits
In Seinfeld v. Seinfeld, 1" a wife's failure to file a financial affi-
davit did not warrant reversal of an award of child support when
the husband had failed to raise the issue at trial or to claim result-
ing prejudice.
In Estes v. Estes,1"  however, the First District struck an
award of child support where both attorneys failed to furnish
financial affidavits before a child support hearing.
Rule 1.611 of the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure requires
filing of financial affidavits before a modification hearing."' Ac-
cording to the First District Court in Nour v. Nour,' 7 however,
failure to comply with this rule does not warrant reversal of the
modification order when substantial evidence supports the order
and no prejudice has ensued.
163. Heiman v. Heiman, 369 So. 2d 956 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978).
164. 363 So. 2d 19 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978).
165. 373 So. 2d 965 (Fla. lt DCA 1979) (per curiam).
166. Hagin v. Hagin, 353 So. 2d 949, 952 (Fla. 2d DCA 1978).
167. Nour v. Nour, 373 So. 2d 379 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979).
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C. Out of State Documents
In In re Bush,1 the First District interpreted section 88.181
of the Florida Statutes1 9 as permitting a trial court in one state to
send documents regarding child support either to the trial court in
Florida or to a state information agency such as the Department of
Legal Affairs.
D. Criteria
A father's spendthrift trust that expressly permits him to dis-
tribute income to support his minor children is a proper asset for
consideration in determining the amount of child support, accord-
ing to the Third District.
1 70
An award of thirty dollars per month for two minor children
was held an abuse of discretion in Davis v. Davis.1 71 Prior to disso-
lution of the marriage, the father had contributed nearly double
the awarded amount towards supporting his children, and his pre-
sent monthly deficit was substantially less than that of the mother
and children. On that basis the District Court of Appeal, Second
District, increased the award to fifty dollars per month per child.
In Genoe v. Genoe,17 2 an award of $2,000 of child support per
month was held excessive, given the wife's improper inclusion of
her own needs in seeking that amount.
In Bragdon v. Bragdon,17 payment of thirty-three percent of a
husband's net income towards support of one child was affirmed,
since no other monetary award was made to his former wife or to
the family.
A state court may not award a parent a federal income tax
deduction for payment of child support. Federal tax matters must
be decided in light of the Internal Revenue Code and regulations,
not according to the provisions of a state court order modifying a
marriage dissolution judgment.7
4
An award of mortgage payments may not be labeled child sup-
port, because the award provides support for the custodial spouse
168. 371 So. 2d 587 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979) (per curiam).
169. FLA. STAT. § 88.181 (1977) provides that: "[w]hen the court of this state, acting as
a responding state, receives from the court of an initiating state the aforesaid copies, it shall
docket the cause .... "
170. Page v. Page, 371 So. 2d 543 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979).
171. 371 So. 2d 591 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979),
172. 373 So. 2d 940 (Fla. 4th DCA 1979).
173. 363 So. 2d 855 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978).
174. Sumner v. Tart, 362 So. 2d 344 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978).
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in addition to benefiting the children.'
A child support award based on misrepresentation of a par-
ent's income is subject to reversal.
17 6
E. Modification
The court may modify child support payments even though
the obligation stems from a voluntary property settlement agree-
ment, 77 but a court may not modify child support solely on its
own motion.178 In Smith v. Smith,'7 ' the trial court impermissibly
reduced an award of child support because no pleading had re-
quested modification nor was there any indication that evidence
produced at the hearing to prove arrearages and ability to pay
would be considered by the court as a basis for modification.
A father's voluntary extra contributions to the support of his
children do not of themselves establish the children's increased
needs which would justify a modification of support. 80
A finding of some reduction in income during a temporary
fourteen month workstrike does not amount to a substantial
change of circumstances sufficient to support a husband's petition
for modification of child support.' 8'
Absent a parent's agreement to support his or her child be-
yond the age of majority, the court may not award child support to
an eighteen year old."8" Section 743.07 of the Florida Statutes, 88
which, as of 1973, lowered the age of majority to eighteen, is not
retroactive.'8 " Therefore, under a divorce decree entered prior to
1973, a parent must continue payment until the child reaches the
age of twenty-one.' 85 In the case of a pre-1973 divorce decree the
only way to modify that obligation is to prove that the child has
married or become self-supporting or emancipated.'
Unless a child remains legally dependent, support terminates
175. Bragdon v. Bragdon, 363 So. 2d 855 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978). Nor may an award of
mortgage payments on a marital home be labeled as rehabilitative alimony. See Busch v.
Busch, 362 So. 2d 691 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978).
176. Erhardt v. Erhardt, 362 So. 2d 70 (Fla. 2d DCA 1978).
177. Coffin v. Coffin, 368 So. 2d 105 (Fla. 4th DCA 1979).
178. Koken v. Neubauer, 374 So. 2d 49 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979).
179. 363 So. 2d 832 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978).
180. Diaco v. Diaco, 363 So. 2d 183 (Fla. 2d DCA 1978).
181. Burdack v. Burdack, 371 So. 2d 528 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979).
182. Rollings v. Rollings, 362 So. 2d 700 (Fla. 2d DCA 1978).
183. FLA. STAT. § 743.07 (1979).
184. Hoffman v. Hoffman, 371 So. 2d 1061 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979).
185. Id.
186. Burgdorf v. Burgdorf, 372 So. 2d 988 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979).
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when the child reaches eighteen. 187 Since the pursuit of college
study does not demonstrate legal dependence,188 an award to pay
for a child's college education is an impermissible extension of the
support period. 8 9 In Mohammad v. Mohammad,'190 however, a
husband's voluntary proposal to pay for his children's college ex-
penses became binding once accepted by the trial court. Neverthe-
less, if the children failed to pursue a college education in good
faith, support would not continue after each one reached age
eighteen.
F. Enforcement
1. SUSPENSION OF VISITATION RIGHTS
A finding of intentional failure to provide child support may
warrant suspension of visitation rights.'01 The court, however, may
not condition visitation rights on future payment of child support,
since at a later time proper justification for nonsupport may
exist.192
2. LEGISLATION
The revised Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support
Act'98 provides for registration of foreign child support orders and
for interstate cooperation in exacting the payment of support. The
Act facilitates the establishment and collection of child support
obligations when the respondent resides in a state other than that
of the petitioner. Additionally, the state or any of its political sub-
divisions may bring an action to recoup owed payments. 19 Support
duties, including the duty to pay arrearages, are enforceable by
civil or criminal contempt proceedings. 195
If a respondent defends an action for child support brought
under the Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act by de-
nying paternity, the court may adjudicate the paternity issue un-
187. Krogen v. Krogen, 320 So. 2d 483 (Fla. 3d DCA 1975).
188. French v. French, 303 So. 2d 668 (Fla. 4th DCA 1974).
189. Kowalski v. Kowalski, 315 So. 2d 497 (Fla. 2d DCA 1975); Coalla v. Coalla, 330 So.
2d 802 (Fla. 2d DCA 1976).
190. 371 So. 2d 1070 (Fla. 18t DCA 1979).
191. Acker v. Acker, 365 So. 2d 181 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978).
192. Id.
193. 1979 Fla. Laws ch. 79-383, §§ 1-42 (amending FLA. STAT. §§ 88.011-.345 (1977)).
194. Id. § 9 (amending FLA. STAT. § 88.091 (1977)).
195. Id. § 10 (amending FLA. STAT. § 88.101 (1977)).
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less the defense is patently frivolous. 96 Alternatively, the support
hearing may be deferred until a determination of paternity has
been made.1 9
IX. CUSTODY OF CHILDREN
A. Discovery
As a matter of due process in the determination of custody, a
parent has a right to depose social workers who have conducted a
custody investigation, as well as others who have supplied informa-
tion in such an investigation. 1 "8
B. Reference to a Master
When a trial judge refers a matter to a master, the findings of
fact and the recommendations of the master should be adopted by
the judge since they are based on firsthand observation of wit-
nesses and evidence.199 Thus, in Shaw v. Shaw, 2°0 the trial court's
reliance on its own determination, rather than on thirty pages of
testimony and the master's report regarding custody, was
erroneous.
Failure to request child support in a petition to modify cus-
tody renders improper the trial court's reliance on a general
master's report regarding child support.201 .
C. Representation
An award of permanent custody to the father has been upheld
although the mother was not represented by counsel at the final
hearing.2 02 The mother's deliberate refusal to cooperate with her
retained attorney and her failure to obtain a replacement when her
lawyer was permitted to withdraw indicated that she had forfeited
her opportunity to have her day in court.20
196. Id. § 25.
197. Id.
198. Hill v. Hill, 371 So. 2d 573 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979).
199. Claughton v. Claughton, 347 So. 2d 437 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977).
200. 369 So. 2d 81 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979).
201. Waszkowski v. Waszkowski, 367 So. 2d 1113 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979).
202. Baugh v. Baugh, 365 So. 2d 733 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978).




In Corvison v. Corvison,2°" the Third District relied on the
"tender years doctrine" to uphold an award of permanent custody
to a mother of two minor children. Under section 61.13(2) of the
Florida Statutes, parents are entitled to equal consideration in the
determination of custody.'0 5 When other factors are equivalent,
however, a mother of a child of tender years should receive major
consideration for custody.
Although articulating the continuing force of the tender years
doctrine, as well as the presumption that the children of one fam-
ily should not be separated except for compelling reasqns, the
Fourth District, in Miller v. Miller, "0 upheld an award of split cus-
tody. Although both parties were found fit and proper, all other
factors were not equal. Hence, the husband was properly awarded
custody of the parties' two natural children, while the wife received




Psychiatric testimony, in addition to further testimony that
the father could give his children a more stable family atmosphere,
supported a change of custody from the mother who intended to
move (thereby reducing the father's visitation rights) and to re-
sume working, while sending the children to day care centers. '08
In Rosenberg v. Rosenberg,09 a change of custody was upheld,
since the trial court had found that the child's "nomad type of ex-
istence 2 10 while in his mother's custody, would be stabilized if he
were returned to the custody of his father.
F. Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act
In Detko/Roberts v. Stikelether,211 a father who had taken his
child from the custody, of her mother to Florida, in violation of an
Alabama custody order, sought modification of custody in Florida.
204. 362 So. 2d 323 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978).
205. FLA. STAT. § 61.13(2) (1979).
206. 371 So. 2d 565 (Fla. 4th DCA 1979).
207. Id. at 566.
208. Berlin v. Berlin, 369 So. 2d 434 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979).
209. 365 So. 2d 185 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978).
210. Id. at 186.
211. 370 So. 2d 383 (Fla. 4th DCA 1979).
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The circuit court held that it had jurisdiction of the subject matter
and the parties, denied the mother's petition for writ of habeas
corpus seeking return of the child to her, and modified the Ala-
bama custody order as to the father's visitation rights. The District
Court of Appeal, Fourth District, held, however, that the trial
court had erroneously assumed jurisdiction. The father filed his
pleadings after Florida's adoption of the Uniform Child Custody
Jurisdiction Act, 2 which was designed, according to the court, to
eliminate the very kind of "child snatching" behavior evidenced by
the father here. Accordingly, the trial court should have declined
to exercise jurisdiction.21
Using the same rationale, the Third District in Bias v. Bias
4
affirmed the jurisdiction of a Florida circuit court since the child's
presence in another state was the result of his mother's violation of
a Florida custody order.
In Hofer v. Agner,2"5 a Florida circuit court had awarded the
mother custody and the father visitation rights. Subsequently, the
mother moved to New York with her children. After a visit by the
children to Florida, the father did not permit them to return to
New York. Upon the mother's petition to enforce the custody
award, the father sought modification in Florida. Although the
children's home state was New York, the Florida trial court had
jurisdiction under section 61.1308(1)(B) of the Uniform Child Cus-
tody Jurisdiction Act. 1 6 The fact that they had lived for most of
their lives and had many relatives in Florida, and that a Florida
court had presided over the child custody proceeding from the be-
ginning gave the children the "significant connection" with Florida
required by the Act.' 17 The court stated, however, that before
awarding attorney's fees and costs the court should consider the
mother's expense and inconvenience in having to defend this sec-
ond custody action, to discourage continued custody battles and
enhance home stability.2
18
212. FLA. STAT. § 61.1302-.1348 (1979).
213. 370 So. 2d at 385.
214. 374 So. 2d 64 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979).
215. 373 So. 2d 48 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979).
216. Under the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act, the Florida court may assume
jurisdiction where: "1. The child and his parents, or the child and at least one contestant,
have a significant connection with this state, and 2. There is available in this state substan-
tial evidence concerning the child's present or future care, protection, training, and personal
relationships . . . ." FLA. STAT. § 61.1308(2)(b) (1979).




The overriding policy of the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdic-
tion Act is to avoid jurisdictional competition and conflict with
courts of other states. Therefore, once Florida is deemed a conven-
ient forum, no other state has jurisdiction, although Florida can
request an out-of-state court for assistance in the determination of
custody.2 1'
On the other hand, in Moser v. Davis,220 the children's pres-
ence in Florida was sufficient to afford a Florida court jurisdiction
to modify a custody decree awarded by a North Carolina court.
The father had not taken the children away from their Georgia
home; rather, the children were present in Florida because they
had run away from their mother who had threatened them and
treated them violently.
In Adams v. Adams,'22 petitioner unsuccessfully sought to in-
voke the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act in an intrastate
custody dispute. Section 61.1304 of the Florida Statutes expressly
provides that application of the Act is limited to interstate custody
disputes.2
In Baird v. Baird,223 a mother was held not in violation of an
Arizona court order since she had brought her child into Florida
from Arizona legitimately and the subsequent actions of the Flor-
ida court were discretionary under sections 61.1302 to 1348 of the
Florida Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act.
G. Legislation
In Wainwright v. Moore,sa the Fourth District determined
that a female prisoner does not have an absolute right to decide
custody of her newborn child. Section 944.24 of the Florida Stat-
utes vests neither the mother nor the Department of Offender Re-
habilitation with sole discretion to determine custody of a child
born to a prisoner for the first eighteen months of the infant's
life. 23 Therefore, the rights of all interested parties, including the
219. Mort v. Mort, 365 So. 2d 194 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978).
220. 364 So. 2d 521 (Fla. 2d DCA 1978).
221. 374 So. 2d 29 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979).
222. FLA. STAT. § 61.1304 (1979).
223. 374 So. 2d 60 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979).
224. 374 So. 2d 586 (Fla. 4th DCA 1979).
225. The court was construing § 944.24 as it existed prior to its amendment in 1979.
The pre-1979 version read as follows:
944.24-Administration of correctional institutions for women.
(2) if any women received by or committed to said institution shall give birth
to a child while an inmate of said institution, such child may be retained in the
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mother, prison officers, officials, and the state must be assessed in
light of the prime consideration of the child's welfare.
226
As recently amended, section 944.24 provides that a child born
to an inmate of a correctional institution is subject to the jurisdic-
tion of the circuit court.22 7 Upon petition of the Department of
Correction, the mother, or an interested third party, the circuit
court will conduct a temporary custody hearing to determine the
best interests of the child.2 28
H. Contempt
A noncustodial parent was held in criminal contempt by a
Florida circuit court for leaving the jurisdiction of the court with
her minor daughter following a visitation period.2 29 The court,
however, neglected to issue an order to show cause prior to its
judgment as is required by rule 3.840 of the Florida Rules of Crim-
inal Procedure.23 In view of the severe sanction of incarceration
that attends a finding of criminal contempt, the district court in-
validated the contempt order because of the trial court's failure to
adhere strictly to the requisite procedures.13
I. Child Visitation Rights
In Baker v. Baker,23 2 the District Court of Appeal, Fourth Dis-
trict, held that a noncustodial parent should not be denied visita-
tion rights unless visitation would be detrimental to the child's
morals or welfare. Additionally, the court indicated that the final
judgment of dissolution should specify whether child visitation
rights have been granted or denied, along with the basis of the rul-
ing, in order to assist the appellate court in its review of the visita-
tion decision. 3
Under current statutory law, grandparents may be awarded
visitation rights when the court determines it to be in the
said institution until it reaches the age of eighteen months, at which time the
Department of Offender Rehabilitation may arrange for its care elsewhere....
FLA. STAT. § 944.24 (1977).
226. 374 So. 2d at 588.
227. 1979 Fla. Laws ch. 79-331 (amending FLA. STAT. § 944.24(2) (1977 & Supp. 1978)).
228. Id. § 1.
229. Bukszar v. Bukszar, 368 So. 2d 430 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979).
230. FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.840.
231. 368 So. 2d at 432.




grandchild's best interest." 4 Section 61.13 of the Florida Statutes,
however, authorizing the award of visitation rights in accordance
with the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act, does not permit
grandparents of a minor child to petition for modification of visita-
tion rights.2 "  Furthermore, although grandparents may be
awarded visitation rights as part of the dissolution proceeding,
they may not bring an independent action for visitation rights
where no dissolution proceeding is pending.23 6 If such rights are
awarded, the court may not require that a child be kept within the
state in order to afford the grandparents visitation rights. 237 Such
limited construction of the statute is designed to protect divorced
parents from a multitude of hearings.238
X. PATERNITY
The Supreme Court of the United States has upheld a New
York statute requiring that illegitimate children who wish to in-
herit from their fathers by intestate succession must present a dec-
laration of paternity made by a court of competent jursidiction
during the life of the father. A majority of the Court in La li v.
Lalli23 9 found that the proof requirement did not violate equal pro-
tection, because it was substantially related to an important, ar-
ticulated state interest of "just and orderly disposition of [a dece-
dent's] property."4 0  The Court conceived the New York
requirement to be merely an evidentiary one. Since there are "pe-
culiar problems of proof"2 41 involved in paternal, as opposed to
maternal, inheritance by illegitmate children, the state had a legiti-
mate interest in ensuring "the accurate resolution of claims of pa-
ternity and [minimizing] the potential disruption of estate admin-
istration. 24 2 The requirement of the New York statute was
acceptable because it did not effect a total statutory disinheritance
of illegitimates, unlike the Illinois statute struck down as unconsti-
tutional by the Court in Trimble v. Gordon,2"3 but addressed in-
stead only the more limited issue of the standard of proof neces-
234. FLA. STAT. §§ 61.13(2)(b) (1977), 68.08 (Supp. 1978).
235. Shuler v. Shuler, 371 So. 2d 588 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979).
236. Osteryoung v. Leibowitz, 371 So. 2d 1068 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979).
237. FLA. STAT. § 61.13(2)(b) (1979).
238. 371 So. 2d at 590.
239. 439 U.S. 259 (1978).
240. Id. at 268.
241. Id.
242. Id. at 271.
243. 430 U.S. 762 (1977).
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sary to establish paternity.
In dissent, Justice Brennan asserted that the majority's deci-
sion was actually a disturbing truncation of the Court's earlier
holding in Trimble." According to his reading of Trimble, the
Court had held that state interests were adequately satisfied by
requiring an illegitimate to offer only a formal acknowledgement of
paternity.2 45 Justice Brennan noted that public acknowledgement
of parentage by the father in Lalli satisfied the criterion previously
established by the Court in Trimble. The majority, however, stated
that the statute at issue in Trimble was unconstitutional because
of its combination of requirements that the father must have ac-
knowledged paternity and legitimized the child by marrying the
mother, thus creating a total bar to intestate inheritance by chil-
dren not so legitimized. The New York statute could be distin-
guished because it created no such bar. 46
In a Florida case, on the other hand, the First District held
that a defendant's letter to the mother which expressly acknowl-
edged paternity was sufficient to sustain a finding of parentage.2 4
In Roe v. Macy,'4 8 the only defense proffered by the putative
father was that the wife may have become pregnant as a result of
having had sexual relations with another named man. Because
blood tests excluded the possibility of parentage by the named in-
dividual, however, the ruling, which denied a finding of paternity,
went against the manifest weight of the evidence.
The Second District declined to compel the putative father to
undergo a new type of blood test which allegedly provides affirma-
tive proof of paternity.'49 To date, only blood tests excluding pa-
ternity have been recognized by the Florida courts. 50 Chief Judge
Grimes, specially concurring, left open the possibility, however,
that where good cause is shown-such as the fact that a baby's
blood type is rare-a motion to compel an affirmative blood test
might be granted.'5 1
The strong presumption of legitimacy of a child born in wed-
244. 439 U.S. at 277 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
245. Id.
246. Id. at 273 (Powell, J., for the majority).
247. State Dept. of Health & Rehab. Servs. v. Jackson, 368 So. 2d 960 (Fla. 1st DCA
1979).
248. 363 So. 2d 616 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978).
249. Simons v. Jorg, 375 So. 2d 288 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979).
250. Id. at 289.
251. Id. at 394.
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lock was overcome in Hill v. Parks.252 Although the mother was
married at the time of conception, uncontradicted evidence
demonstrated that she had not lived with nor had sexual inter-
course with her husband for over seven years, and that the defen-
dant had been the only man with whom she had had sexual rela-
tions during the relevant period.
In Estanislao v. State,25- a mother brought a paternity suit
under chapter 742 of the Florida Statutes, seeking to establish de-
fendant's parentage and child support. The defendant was person-
ally served pursuant to section 48.193(1)(e) providing for service in
"independent action[s] for support of dependents. ' 254 The putative
father contended that a paternity action is distinct from an inde-
pendent action for child support and hence that service was defec-
tive. The First District rejected the father's assertion, citing the
express language of chapter 742: "This chapter shall be in lieu of
any other proceeding provided by law for the determination of pa-
ternity and support of children born out of wedlock.
255
XI. ADOPTION
In Caban v. Mohammad,2 56 the Supreme Court of the United
States invalidated a New York statute permitting unwed mothers,
but not unwed fathers, to block adoption by withholding consent.
Since the gender-based distinction bore no substantial relation to
an important state interest, the statute violated the equal protec-
tion clause of the fourteenth amendment. The Court rejected the
mother's claim that a natural mother always bears a closer rela-
tionship with her child than does a natural father.2 57 The Court
noted that the family had lived together for several years, during
which time the father had established a close bond with his chil-
dren and had admitted paternity.2 5 8 Therefore, the state could not
support the gender-based distinction by pointing to any difficulty
in identifying the father of this illegitimate child.259
252. 373 So. 2d 376 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979).
253. 368 So. 2d 677 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979).
254. FLA. STAT. § 48.193(1)(3) (1979).
255. 368 So. 2d at 678.
256. 441 U.S. 380 (1979).
257. Id. at 388.
258. Id. at 393.
259. Id.
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A. Criteria
In Nelson v. Herndon,260 the First District reversed an adop-
tion order where the prospective adoptive parents failed to show
abandonment by the child's natural parent. No abandonment by
the child's father was demonstrated; thus, under section 63.072 of
the Florida Statutes parental consent was required in order to
grant adoption.2 1 Since the father objected, adoption was imper-
missible. Judge Miller, specially concurring, was reluctant to join
in the reversal because the record indicated by clear and convinc-
ing evidence that the best interests of the child would be served by
adoption. He suggested that the state legislature consider amend-
ing section 63.072 to include "the best interests of the child" as an
additional circumstance that would excuse the need for parental
consent to adoption.262
In In re Adoption of King, 63 a petition was brought on the
grounds of abandonment to adopt a child over the objection of the
natural father. The father had failed to pay adequate child support
during the period in which the child was not in his physical cus-
tody and had failed to visit the child in the home of the would-be
adoptive parents. Since the father was unemployed and lacked suf-
ficient funds, however, the court held that abandonment was not
established by clear and convincing evidence.264
Failure to pay child support did not constitute abandonment
justifying adoption, when the mother had concealed the child's
whereabouts from the father.2 6 In this case the father had failed
to pay child support for seventeen months prior to the adoption
proceeding initated by the mother and stepfather. Since the
mother had moved three times during that period without telling
the father, the court found no evidence of-abandonment and re-
versed the trial court's order of adoption.
B. Evidentiary Requirements
The trial court relied on records of prior proceedings in grant-
ing the petition for adoption in In re Adoption of Davis.2 6 These
records, which included a final judgment of dissolution granting
260. 371 So. 2d 140 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979).
261. FLA. STAT. § 63.072 (1979).
262. 371 So. 2d at 141.
263. 373 So. 2d 384 (Fla. 4th DCA 1979).
264. Id. at 385.
265. Barrett v. Reed, 363 So. 2d 14 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978).
266. 369 So. 2d 89 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979).
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the mother custody, an order prohibiting visitation by the father,
and psychiatric reports regarding the father, were not introduced
formally into evidence. The order of adoption was reversed on ap-
peal, the First District ruling that where records of prior separate
proceedings were relied upon but not introduced in evidence, the
order could not be upheld.
C. Legislation
Although records of all custody and adoption proceedings are
confidential, a family medical history may be furnished to the
adopting parents and to the adopted person at his or her request
upon reaching the age of majority. To protect confidentiality of the
natural parent, however, no names may be listed in the family
medical history267
The legal relationship between an adopted child and a natural
parent married to the adopting party does not change with the or-
der of adoption.268
XII. DEPENDENCY PROCEEDINGS
A declaration of dependency pursuant to a proceeding brought
by the state on behalf of a minor may permanently deprive the
child's parents of custody. The state, therefore, must prove depen-
dency according to a stringent standard of "clear and convincing
evidence."2 9
A parent is entitled to representation by counsel at a custody
proceeding brought by the state.270 When long term separation be-
comes a "very real possibility," due process mandates that a parent
be apprised of her right to counsel; if indigent, she must be sup-
plied representation at state expense. Any waiver of counsel must
be intelligently made.2
In In re Peterson,7 2 the juvenile division judge improperly
dismissed a dependency petition on the grounds that a judge of the
same circuit had previously entered an order regarding the child's
custody and had reserved jurisdiction of the matter. Jurisdiction
over the welfare and custody of children resides in the circuit court
267. FLA. STAT. §§ 63.022(j), 63.082, 63.162(5) (1979).
268. 1979 Fla. Laws ch. 79-369.
269. In re C.K.G., 365 So. 2d 424, 425 (Fla. 2d DCA 1978).
270. In re R.W.H., 375 So. 2d 321 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979).
271. Id. at 323.
272. 364 So. 2d 98 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978).
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itself. Jurisdiction is not retained by any individual circuit judge,
but rather exists in any judge at the circuit level.
A parent may not be charged with neglect for failing to pro-
vide his or her child medical treatment on account of the parent's
religious beliefs, because section 827.07 of the Florida Statutes, as
amended, recognizes the legitimate practice of a parent's religious
beliefs as an exception to neglectful, abrasive "harm. 2 73 The stat-
ute, however, states that this
exception shall not preclude a court from ordering, when the
health of the child requires it, the provision of medical services
by a physician . . . or treatment by a duly accredited practioner
who relies solely on spiritual means for healing in accordance




In Williamson v. State, 76 a ten-year-old child removed from
his mother's custody had been placed with a foster family living
outside Florida. Since the Florida Department of Health and Re-
habilitative Services lacked authority to supervise the foster fam-
ily, the district court held that the placement was improper. The
court stated that a foster home is not a permanent custodial
change, but rather a means of preparing the child for returning to
his or her natural parents. Thus, if the child should be continued
in foster care, she must be placed in a home within Florida, so that
the mother may exercise reasonable rights of visitation.2 76
XIV. FAMILY IMMUNITY DOCTRINE
A. Interspousal Immunity
In West v. West,2" 7 7 a petitioner brought suit against her for-
mer spouse for permanent injuries inflicted while the parties were
married. Since the Supreme Court of Florida had reaffirmed the
doctrine of interspousal immunities in Bencomo v. BencomoM the
Second District affirmed dismissal. The appellate court noted,
273. 1979 Fla. Laws ch. 79-203, § 2 (amending FLA. STAT. § 827.07 (1977 & Supp.
1978)).
274. Id. (amending FLA. STAT. § 39.01(27) (1977 & Supp. 1978)).
275. 369 So. 2d 660 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979).
276. Id. at 662.
277. 372 So. 2d 170 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979).
278. 200 So. 2d 171 (Fla. 1967).
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however, that abrogation of the doctrine under the circumstances
of West might reduce physical abuse, since an injuring party would
then be aware of the likelihood of prosecution after the marriage.
The court certified the following question to the supreme court:
"Whether a former spouse can maintain an action against another
spouse for an intentional tort allegedly committed during mar-
riage, where such marriage has been dissolved by divorce? 2'7 9
Under recent legislation, the circuit court may issue a re-
straining order on petition of an abused spouse without requiring
the spouse's representation by an attorney. The Department of
Health and Rehabilitative Services has been charged with the re-
sponsibility of inspecting and prescribing services for state-funded
spouse abuse centers.280
B. Parent-Child Immunity
In 3-M Electric Corp. v. Vigoa,'81 parents named 3-M as co-
defendant in a personal injury suit alleging 3-M's negligence in
failing to remove a piece of pipe protruding from the ground in the
backyard of the family's new home. 3-M Electric Corporation
sought contribution against the parents, asserting their negligence
in caring for the child. The Third District considered the applica-
bility of the Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act in light
of the common law doctrine of family immunity. The court noted
that the law of contribution among joint tortfeasors is designed to
apportion payment of injured third parties among those causing
the damage. In order to protect family harmony and resources, a
parent is immune from liability for torts that arise within the fam-
ily unit.28 2 Since the family immunity doctrine bars parental liabil-
ity in such a situation, the parents could not be considered joint
tortfeasors with 3-M Electric Corporation.28
In Florida Farm Bureau Insurance Co. v. Government Em-
ployees Insurance Co.,2" a passenger in a car driven by her hus-
band brought a personal injury suit against the driver, the owner
of the other car, and that owner's insurer. The defendants in turn
counter-claimed against the husband and his insurer. The court
found the driver ninety-percent negligent and the wife's husband
279. 372 So. 2d at 172.
280. 1979 Fla. Laws ch. 79-402.
281. 369 So. 2d 405 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979).
282. Id. at 407.
283. Id.
284. 371 So. 2d 166 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979).
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ten-percent negligent. After paying the wife on behalf of the driver
and the owner, the owner's insurer filed a third party complaint
against the husband and the husband's insurer, seeking contribu-
tion. The husband's insurer denied coverage based on a family ex-
clusion clause in the policy.
The First District held that the family exclusion clause did not
bar recovery of the third party contribution claim in this case.2 8'
The court found that prior judicial abrogation of the interspousal
immunities doctrine for contribution claims286 had undercut policy
reasons supporting such clauses, rendering them contrary to public
policy. The rationale for such clauses and for the interspousal im-
munities doctrine, to protect an insurer from direct, collusive law-
suits between family members, does not apply in the context of a
third-party action for contribution from a party found responsible
by a jury for a portion of the damages suffered by the other mem-
ber of his family.' 87 The traditional policy underlying interspousal
immunity-protection of family harmony and resources-is simi-
larly inapplicable in a third-party action for contribution.'88
Additionally, the court found that the common law inter-
spousal immunities doctrine would not control over the Uniform
Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act to prevent one tortfeasor
from seeking contribution from another tortfeasor simply because
the other is a spouse of the injured party. Since no controlling au-
thority exists on the point, however, the Third District certified
the question to the Supreme Court of Florida as follows: "Does a
family exclusion clause in an automobile liability insurance policy
control over the Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act to
prevent one tortfeasor from seeking contribution from another
when the other is the spouse of the injured person who has re-
ceived damages from the first tortfeasor?"' 9
XV. WRONGFUL DEATH
In Whitefield v. Kainer,290 an illegitimate child born nine
months after the putative father was killed in a motorcycle acci-
dent sought recovery under the Florida Wrongful Death Statute.
There was no evidence that the putative father knew of the
285. Id. at 167.
286. Shor v. Paoli, 353 So. 2d 825 (Fla. 1977).
287. 371 So. 2d at 167.
288. d.
289. Id.
290. 369 So. 2d 684 (Fla. 4th DCA 1979).
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mother's pregnancy or had recognized any responsibility for the
child's support. The Fourth District upheld denial of recovery. Al-
though a "survivor" entitled to recovery 'Under section 768.18(11)
of the Florida Wrongful Death Statute includes a mother's illegiti-
mate child, it does not signify an illegitimate child of a father un-
les? the father has recognized a responsibility for the child's
support. 91
In Grant v. Sedco,2 "2 a wrongful death action was brought on
behalf of a child who had been given by its natural mother to the
deceased when the child was three days old. The deceased failed to
adopt the child legally. Reasoning that equitable adoption merely
enforces a contract right and does not establish the creation of a
parent-child relationship, the court held that an equitably adopted
child may not recover in a wrongful death action.293
291. Id. at 685.
292. 364 So. 2d 774 (Fla. 2d DCA 1978).
293. Id. at 775.
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